Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round ARIA and Camellia |
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Authors: | Wen-Ling Wu Wen-Tao Zhang Deng-Guo Feng |
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Affiliation: | 1 State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080, China ;2 State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080, China |
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Abstract: | This paper studies the security of the block ciphers ARIA and Camellia against impossible differential cryptanalysis. Our work improves the best impossible differential cryptanalysis of ARIA and Camellia known so far. The designers of ARIA expected no impossible differentials exist for 4-round ARIA. However, we found some nontrivial 4-round impossible differentials, which may lead to a possible attack on 6-round ARIA. Moreover, we found some nontrivial 8-round impossible differentials for Camellia, whereas only 7-round impossible differentials were previously known. By using the 8-round impossible differentials, we presented an attack on 12-round Camellia without FL/FL^-1 layers. |
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Keywords: | block cipher ARIA Camellia data complexity time complexity impossible differential cryptanalysis |
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