政府投资代建制项目双边道德风险的博弈研究

在综合分析代建制下政府投资项目中政府和代建方委托代理关系的基础上,根据委托代理理论,指明无论是委托方还是代理方都有可能单方面做出对自己有利的决策而损害对方利益,发生道德风险;因此运用博弈论的方法建立政府投资代建制项目委托方和代理方之间的博弈模型,并分别从显性激励机制,隐性激励机制以及锦标制度约束双方的视角进行风险防范分析。基于博弈分析的结果,对防止政府投资代建制项目发生道德风险提出了政策建议。

Game Research on Double-sided Moral Hazards of Government Investment Construction-agent Project

Based on the comprehensive analysis of principal-agent relationship between government and agent under construction-agent system of government investment project, it is pointed out that moral hazards, according to the principal-agent theory,would be triggered when the entrusting party or the agent is likely to unilaterally make advantageous decision and damage interests of the other side. Therefore, game models are built between the entrusting party and the agent using the method of game,and then risk preventions are analyzed from the perspective of explicit incentive mechanism,the implicit incentive mechanism and rank-order tournaments to restrain both sides. Based on the result of game analysis,the policy recommendations are put forward to prevent moral risk for government investment construction-agent system project.