首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

日前电力市场不完全信息条件下的电力供需双边博弈模型
引用本文:蒋玮,吴杰,冯伟,段小峰,汤海波,吴磊. 日前电力市场不完全信息条件下的电力供需双边博弈模型[J]. 电力系统自动化, 2019, 43(2): 18-24
作者姓名:蒋玮  吴杰  冯伟  段小峰  汤海波  吴磊
作者单位:东南大学电气工程学院,江苏省南京市,210096;国网泰州供电公司,江苏省泰州市,225309
基金项目:国家重点研发计划资助项目(2016YFB0901104);国网江苏省电力有限公司科技项目(J2017112)
摘    要:随着大用户直购电的深入开展,中长期双边交易的市场化和现货交易非市场化之间的矛盾日益凸显,日前电力市场的构建迫在眉睫。建立了在日前电力市场中,电力供需双方间的不完全信息条件下的双边博弈模型,旨在为电力交易供需双方提供一种切实可行的博弈方案,使得双方可以在电力市场中获得最大的利益。模型以直购电价和直购电量作为博弈双方的预测重点,关于直购电价部分,引入发电成本因子,利用协整理论,构建考虑误差修正的直购电价与发电成本的关系模型;直购电量部分则利用相似日法进行预测。最后利用纳什均衡求出双边博弈的均衡解,并通过实例对所提出模型的有效性进行了证明。

关 键 词:日前电力市场  双边博弈  发电成本  直购电价  直购电量  纳什均衡
收稿时间:2018-06-15
修稿时间:2018-12-06

Bilateral Game Model of Power Supply and Demand Sides with Incomplete Information in Day-ahead Electricity Market
JIANG Wei,WU Jie,FENG Wei,DUAN Xiaofeng,TANG Haibo and WU Lei. Bilateral Game Model of Power Supply and Demand Sides with Incomplete Information in Day-ahead Electricity Market[J]. Automation of Electric Power Systems, 2019, 43(2): 18-24
Authors:JIANG Wei  WU Jie  FENG Wei  DUAN Xiaofeng  TANG Haibo  WU Lei
Affiliation:School of Electrical Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China,School of Electrical Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China,State Grid Taizhou Power Supply Company, Taizhou 225309, China,State Grid Taizhou Power Supply Company, Taizhou 225309, China,School of Electrical Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China and School of Electrical Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
Abstract:With the in-depth development of the direct power purchase by large consumers, the contradiction between the marketization of medium-long term bilateral transactions and the non-marketization of spot transactions has become increasingly prominent, thus the construction of the day-ahead electricity market is imminent. A bilateral game model is established with the incomplete information between power supply and demand sides in the day-ahead electricity market, which is aimed to provide a practical game scheme for both sides in the power transactions, so that both sides can obtain the greatest benefits in the power market. The model takes the direct power purchase price and amount as the key points of the game. For the part of the direct power purchase price, the generation cost factor is introduced and the co-integration theory is used to construct the relationship model between the direct power purchase price and the generation cost considering the error correction. The part of the direct electricity purchase amount is predicted by similar day method. Finally, the Nash equilibrium is used to find the solution of the bilateral game and the effectiveness of the proposed model is proved by an example.
Keywords:day-ahead electricity market   bilateral game   generation cost   direct power purchase price   direct power purchase amount   Nash equilibrium
本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《电力系统自动化》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《电力系统自动化》下载全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号