PPP 项目动态绩效激励机制的棘轮效应问题研究

为分析PPP 项目动态绩效激励机制中棘轮效应的作用机理，基于委托代理理论建立PPP 项目单阶段静态绩效激励模型和两阶段动态绩效激励模型，通过动静态模型结果的对比，分析了棘轮效应对社会资本方努力程度、社会资本方经济效益、政府综合效益的影响；引入市场声誉机制寻求应对棘轮效应的措施，模型结果表明声誉激励有助于弱化棘轮效应，但并不能完全消除棘轮效应的影响；并提出显性激励和隐性激励相结合的动态绩效激励措施和建议。

Ratchet Effect of the Dynamic Performance Incentive Mechanism of PPP Projects

To analyze the ratchet effect of the dynamic performance incentive mechanism of PPP projects，single-stage static andtwo-stage dynamic performance incentive models are established based on the principal-agent theory. By comparing the resultsbetween dynamic and static models，this paper analyzes the impact of ratchet effect on the effort of social capital，economic benefitsof social capital and comprehensive benefits of government. To deal with the ratchet effect，the market reputation incentivemechanism is taken into account，and the results show that reputation incentive is helpful to alleviate the ratchet effect，but it fails tocompletely eliminate the ratchet effect. Finally，this paper puts forward the explicit and implicit incentive measures and suggestionsfor PPP projects dynamic performance incentive.