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特色小镇PPP项目公私合作行为演化机制研究
引用本文:陈琳,张琳,辛意如.特色小镇PPP项目公私合作行为演化机制研究[J].工程管理学报,2020,34(4):100-105.
作者姓名:陈琳  张琳  辛意如
作者单位:山东建筑大学 管理工程学院
基金项目:山东省高等学院人文社科项目;山东省社会科学基金规划项目;住房和城乡建设科技计划;山东建筑大学国创计划项目
摘    要:为探究PPP模式下特色小镇的公私合作机制,以演化博弈论为理论依据,构建政府方与社会资本方的演化博弈模型,分析双方的演化均衡稳定策略。选取案例项目进行数值仿真,探究各相关变量对演化路径的影响机制。结果表明,提高社会资本方的收益回报,降低积极合作成本,增加消极合作的惩罚力度,降低政府方扶持成本,提升特色小镇PPP项目的社会效益,能改变博弈收敛方向,实现稳定的合作共赢策略。

关 键 词:特色小镇  PPP模式  演化博弈

Research on the Evolution Mechanism of Public-Private PartnershipBehavior of PPP Projects in Characteristic Town
CHEN Lin,ZHANG Lin,XIN Yi-ru.Research on the Evolution Mechanism of Public-Private PartnershipBehavior of PPP Projects in Characteristic Town[J].Journal of Engineering Management,2020,34(4):100-105.
Authors:CHEN Lin  ZHANG Lin  XIN Yi-ru
Affiliation:School of Management Engineering,Shandong Jianzhu University
Abstract:In order to explore the public-private cooperation mechanism of characteristic towns under the PPP model,the evolutionary game model between local government and social capital is constructed based on the evolutionary game theory,and the evolutionary equilibrium and stability strategies of both sides are analyzed. Finally,the case project is selected for numerical simulation to explore the influence mechanism of the relevant variables on the evolution path. The results show that increasing the return of social capital,reducing the cost of positive cooperation,increasing the punishment of negative cooperation,reducing the cost of local government support,and improving the social benefits of the characteristic town PPP project can effectively change the convergence direction of evolutionary equilibrium and achieve a stable win-win cooperation strategy.
Keywords:characteristic town  PPP model  evolutionary game
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