| 基于博弈模型的水银行存水机制分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 华坚,王晓玥. 基于博弈模型的水银行存水机制分析[J]. 水电能源科学, 2013, 31(3): 127-130,255 |
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| 作者姓名： | 华坚 王晓玥 |
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| 作者单位： | 河海大学 商学院， 江苏 南京 211100 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目（12YJC630062） |
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| 摘 要： | 针对国内水银行研究的现状，运用不完全信息博弈模型，分析了水银行存水机制中交易参与方的行为特征，获得了有效存水机制的先决条件，得出有效的存水机制极大地依赖于水权市场的有效性，降低信息不对称能提高双方对对方报价的信任程度、存水机制交易的有效性。
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| 关 键 词： | 水银行； 存水机制； 不完全信息动态博弈； 信息不对称 |
Analysis of Water Bank Storage Mechanism Based on Game Model |
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| HUA Jian and WANG Xiaoyue. Analysis of Water Bank Storage Mechanism Based on Game Model[J]. International Journal Hydroelectric Energy, 2013, 31(3): 127-130,255 |
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| Authors: | HUA Jian and WANG Xiaoyue |
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| Affiliation: | Business School of Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China |
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| Abstract: | Aiming at the current situation of the domestic water bank, incomplete information game model is applied to analyze the behavior of two parties in the transaction of water bank storage mechanism. And the prerequisite for effective water storage mechanism is obtained. It draws a conclusion that the effectiveness of water storage mechanism is greatly dependent on the validity of the water rights market and the reduction of information asymmetry can raise the level of trust between two sides for the other quotations as well as the effectiveness of water storage mechanism. |
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| Keywords: | water bank water storage mechanism incomplete information dynamic game information asymmetry |
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