考虑动态电量和无限次博弈的电动汽车上网电价模型

电力物联网的建设与发展为电力系统中设备互联互通提供了硬件基础和技术支持。电动汽车(electric vehicle,EV)作为基于传统化石燃料汽车的革新产物,其大规模并网不仅能刺激可再生能源的消纳,更可以充当移动储能装置参与电网电能供给。在此背景下,文章首先针对电动汽车上网电价博弈创新性地引入了动态电量的概念,通过建立Rubinstein博弈模型,研究了包含虚拟电动汽车聚合商和电网的清洁能源上网电价的动态博弈问题,针对不同量清洁电能利用建立的博弈模型得到了有限次放电电价博弈均衡解,并进一步深化研究将其拓展到无限次博弈层面。然后,结合目前我国电动汽车产业的发展速度,分情形考虑实际情况中不同市场规模下交易过程中博弈双方的效益变化情况。之后,通过仿真分析发现,有限次博弈中的博弈效益将受双方产业规模及总博弈次数影响;在交易中无限次博弈能否达成最优解取决于博弈双方所在地的市场结构。最后,研究还发现,提高电动汽车聚合商产业规模可以有效增大聚合商效益,提高电动汽车经济性并促进清洁能源消纳。

Discharge Pricing Model of Electric Vehicles Considering Dynamic Electricity and Infinite Game

The construction and development of the power internet of things provides hardware and technical support for the interconnection of equipment in the power system. As the innovation of traditional fossil fuel vehicles， the large-scale grid-connection of electric vehicles can not only stimulate the consumption of renewable energy， but also serve as mobile energy storage devices to participate in power supply. In this context， this paper innovatively introduces the concept of dynamic electricity for the game of electric vehicles on grid-fed price. By establishing Rubinstein game model， this paper studies the dynamic game between the virtual electric vehicle aggregator and the grid about the on-grid price of clean energy. According to the game model of different amount of clean energy utilization， the game equilibrium solution of electricity price for limited-times discharge is obtained and deepening research will be expanded to infinite game. At the same time， combined with the current development speed of electric vehicles in China， the paper considers the changes of benefits of both sides of the game in the actual trading process under different market scales. Through the simulation analysis， it is found that the game benefit in the finite game will be affected by the total game times and the industrial scale of both sides. Whether the infinite game can reach the optimal solution in the transaction depends on the market structure of the both sides of the game. It is concluded that increasing the industrial scale of EV aggregators can effectively increase the benefits of aggregators， improve the economic efficiency of EV and promote the consumption of clean energy.