考虑互惠利他偏好和政府补贴的绿色供应链最优决策研究

为了研究政府补贴、绿色供应链制造商及零售商的互惠利他偏好对双方定价策略、利润、产品绿色度及绿色供应链整体利润的影响，运用博弈理论结合数值仿真方法对4种决策情形下的绿色供应链成员最优策略进行了研究。结果表明，制造商或零售商单方面的互惠利他偏好均会降低自身利润，提高产品绿色度、对方利润及供应链整体利润，且当双方互惠利他程度相同时，零售商的互惠利他偏好更能有效提高产品绿色度;无论是制造商或零售商具有互惠利他偏好，政府增加补贴均会在一定程度上增强其互惠利他偏好对产品绿色度、对方利润及供应链整体利润的提升作用，但不同的是，当制造商具有互惠利他偏好时，政府增加补贴会在一定程度上加重其互惠利他偏好对其自身利润的损害作用，当零售商互惠利他时则不会出现这种情况。

A Research on the Optimal Decision of Green Supply Chain Considering Reciprocal Altruistic Preference and Government Subsidies

In order to study the impact of government subsidies, the reciprocal altruism preferences of the manufacturer and the retailer in a green supply chain on two parties’ pricing strategies, profit, product green degree and overall profit of green supply chain, the green supply chain members’ optimal strategies are studied by using game theory and numerical simulation method. The research shows that the unilateral reciprocal altruistic preference of the manufacturer or retailer will reduce its own profit and increase the product green degree, the counterparty’s profit and the overall profit of the supply chain. Moreover, when both sides have the same degree of reciprocal altruistic preference, the retailer’s reciprocal altruistic preference can improve the product green degree more effectively; whether the manufacturer or the retailer has reciprocal altruism preference, the increase in government subsidies will enhance the promotion impact of its reciprocal altruism preference to product green degree, the counterparty’s profit and the overall profit of the supply chain to some extent, but the difference is that when the manufacturer has reciprocal altruism preference, the increase in government subsidies will aggravate the damage of its reciprocal altruistic preference to its own profit to certain extent, and such case will not happen when the retailer has reciprocal altruism preference.