| 企业信用模型的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 吴诗启,邱红.企业信用模型的博弈分析[J].中原工学院学报,2005,16(2):5-7,19. |
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| 作者姓名： | 吴诗启 邱红 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 中南财经政法大学,湖北,武汉,430060
2. 中南财经政法大学,湖北,武汉,430060;中原工学院,河南,郑州,450007 |
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| 摘 要： | 信用是企业核心竞争力不可或缺的一环,基于信用的市场交易对于降低交易费用、弥补契约的不完全性、增强市场权力等有着重要的现实意义.本文在科学合理假设的基础上,构建了企业建立信用的模型,分别进行了混同均衡和分离均衡的推导,指出企业建立信用是追求效用最大化的"经济人"理性选择的结果,揭示了信用机制的核心所在.
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| 关 键 词： | 企业 信用 模型 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-6906(2005)02-0005-04 |
Game Analysis of Enterprise Trust Model |
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| WU Shi-qi,Qiu Hong.Game Analysis of Enterprise Trust Model[J].Journal of Zhongyuan Institute of Technology,2005,16(2):5-7,19. |
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| Authors: | WU Shi-qi Qiu Hong |
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| Abstract: | Trust is the important part of enterprise's core competence, transaction based on trust has a realistic meaning on lower the transaction cost, making up the incompletion of the contract and strengthening the market power, etc. Based on scientific and reasonable condition, the paper designs a model of trust establishment, through analysis of mixing and separate balance, points out that this is the result of rational choice of "economic man" pursuing maximal utility, and indicates the core of trust mechanism. |
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| Keywords: | enterprise trust model game |
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