激励性输配分开电力市场竞价机制的建模

只有卖方竞争而没有买方竞争的市场不能称之为完善的市场。就电力市场而言,发电竞争只是电力改革的初级阶段,输配分开是电力市场化的必经道路。鉴于电力市场中的信息不对称性,为克服市场成员的策略性报价行为,实现市场的有效调度与稳定运营,合理的竞价机制非常重要。本文应用机制设计理论,给出了一种激励性输配分开电力市场竟价机制,该竞价机制同时满足激励相容特性与个人理性要求,并且考虑了输电容量约束。最后,基于Monte—Carlo模拟,采用修改的IEEE5机14节点电力系统为例说明了该竞价机制的基本特征。

Research on Modeling the Incentive Bidding Mechanism for Transmission and Distribution Separated Electricity Markets

A perfect market should have competition not only seller side but also buyer side.As far as power market is concerned,generation side competition is the preliminary stage of electricity market,transmission and distribution separation is the inevitable course of electric power industry deregulation. Because of the unbalance information in electricity market,to overcome the strategic bidding of market participants,it is essential to design a proper bidding mechanism to realize the efficient dispatch and stable operation of electricity market. Using mechanism design theory,a bidding mechanism for transmission and distribution separated electricity market is proposed,which is of both incentive compatibilityand individual rationality,and the transmission capacity constraint is taken into account.The basic characters of the proposed bidding mechanism are demonstrated by the simulation results of a revised IEEE 5-generator 14-bus power system based on Monte-Carlo simulation.