A Black-Box Construction of Non-malleable Encryption from Semantically Secure Encryption |
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Authors: | Seung Geol Choi Dana Dachman-Soled Tal Malkin Hoeteck Wee |
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Affiliation: | 1.US Naval Academy,Annapolis,USA;2.University of Maryland,College Park,USA;3.Columbia University,New York,USA;4.CNRS-DIENS,école Normale Supérieure,Paris,France |
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Abstract: | We show how to transform any semantically secure encryption scheme into a non-malleable one, with a black-box construction that achieves a quasi-linear blow-up in the size of the ciphertext. This improves upon the previous non-black-box construction of Pass, Shelat and Vaikuntanathan (Crypto ’06). Our construction also extends readily to guarantee non-malleability under a bounded-CCA2 attack, thereby simultaneously improving on both results in the work of Cramer et al. (Asiacrypt ’07). Our construction departs from the oft-used paradigm of re-encrypting the same message with different keys and then proving consistency of encryption. Instead, we encrypt an encoding of the message; the encoding is based on an error-correcting code with certain properties of reconstruction and secrecy from partial views, satisfied, e.g., by a Reed–Solomon code. |
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