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工程质量风险的经济学解释与风险防范
引用本文:何寿奎,傅鸿源.工程质量风险的经济学解释与风险防范[J].土木建筑与环境工程,2006,28(6):106-110.
作者姓名:何寿奎  傅鸿源
作者单位:重庆大学,建设管理与房地产学院,重庆,400045;重庆交通大学,重庆,400074;重庆大学,建设管理与房地产学院,重庆,400045
摘    要:工程项目各参与方在不同阶段均面临不同的质量风险,并各自采取不同的质量风险管理决策。首先从新古典经济学角度,基于利益分歧对业主和承包商在工程质量风险管理方面决策进行经济学解释。建设项目业主与承包商之间、政府与项目法人之间的经济关系集中反映在信息的不对称性与契约的不完备性,从信息经济学角度分析建设项目委托代理关系的规律和基本特征,基于委托—代理关系对质量风险管理决策进行经济学解释。从经济学的角度提出了防范工程质量风险的措施。

关 键 词:质量风险  新古典经济学  经济学解释  信息不对称  风险控制

An Economic Explanation of the Engineering Quality Risk and Risk Prevention
HE Shou - kui,FU Hong - yuan.An Economic Explanation of the Engineering Quality Risk and Risk Prevention[J].土木建筑与环境工程,2006,28(6):106-110.
Authors:HE Shou - kui  FU Hong - yuan
Affiliation:1. College of Construction Management and Real Estate, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400045, P. R. China ; 2. Chongqing Jiaotong Uni- versity, Chongqing 400074, P. R. China
Abstract:Each party in engineering project faces different quality risk in different stage,and each adopts different management decision against quality risk.Firstly,from the new classic economics angle,an economic explanation to the management decision against engineering quality risk according to the different benefits for contractor and owner.The owner and contractor of a construction project,the government and projection legal person find their economic ties in an asymmetric information supply,or in an imperfectly assigned contract.The rules and characteristics of entrust-agency relation are analyzed from the economics and information economics angle,an economic explanation of engineering quality risk is given according to entrust-agency relation.The measures of controlling quality risk have been put forward from the angle of the economics.
Keywords:quality risk  new classic economics  economic explanation  asymmetric information  risk control
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