| 制造商为核心企业的三级供应链套牢问题研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈祥国,季建华.制造商为核心企业的三级供应链套牢问题研究[J].武汉理工大学学报,2005,27(4):95-98. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈祥国 季建华 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学管理学院,上海,200030 |
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| 基金项目： | 家自然科学基金 (70 4 72 0 5 7) |
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| 摘 要： | 以解决制造商为核心企业的供应链套牢问题为出发点，给出了由制造商协调的供应链这种特定结构供应链的套牢问题合约解。在假定制造商拥有所有讨价还价的权力的条件下，从对最优产量的激励和对在最优产量下最优投资的激励2个方面得出了激励条件。因此，通过签订一个不完全合约可以解决制造商为核心企业的供应链的套牢问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链 套牢问题 合约设计 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-4431(2005)04-0095-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年12月24 |
Study on Hold-up Problem in Three Tier Supply Chain Coordinated by Manufacture |
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| CHEN Xiang-guo,JI Jian-hua.Study on Hold-up Problem in Three Tier Supply Chain Coordinated by Manufacture[J].Journal of Wuhan University of Technology,2005,27(4):95-98. |
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| Authors: | CHEN Xiang-guo JI Jian-hua |
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| Abstract: | The hold-up problem in supply chain that coordinated by the manufacture was solved. On the assumption that all bargaining power was possessed by manufacture, two incentive conditions(the transfer prices) were concluded: the incentive condition of the first-best production quantity and the incentive condition of the first-best investment under the first-best production quantity. The conclusion also verified that an incomplete contract could solve the hold-up problem in supply chain that coordinated by manufacture. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain hold-up problem contract design |
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