考虑谈判力因素的 PPP 项目控制权配置研究

为了探讨在不同谈判力格局下，PPP 项目该如何通过控制权调整来实现项目收益最大化，在 FM 模型的基础上引入谈判力这个因素可以解决此问题。分析了引入谈判力因素的必要性，在 FM 模型的基础上，构建了考虑谈判力因素的模型，并通过数据模拟得到了最优控制权配置与谈判力之间的关系。结果表明:当项目为纯公共性质时，控制权为 0/1 配置，随着项目公共性的减弱，控制权应该在公私双方之间连续配置；在其他条件等同的情况下，项目的控制权总是应该向谈判力稍弱的一方倾斜，以此形成投资激励实现项目的效率最大化

Control Rights Allocation in Public-Private-Partnerships Porjects: :Considering Bargaining Power

In order to solve the problem of how to allocate control rights in PPP projects in different bargaining power structures tomaximize the project value，the bargaining power should be introduced into FM model. After demonstrating the necessity to considerparty’s bargaining power by reviewing relevant studies，this study builds a model based on the FM theory. With data simulation，therelationship between optimal allocation of control rights and bargaining power is obtained. The result shows that:when the goods orservices are purely from the public，the control rights should be given to a specific party. With the reduction of the public property，the control rights should be allocated into both private and public parties. with other conditions remain the same，the control rightsshould be given to the party with less bargaining power in order to achieve investment incentive and maximize the PPP project value.