| 两阶段供应链期权契约协调 |
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| 引用本文： | 张正祥,陈志伟,郑冰冰.两阶段供应链期权契约协调[J].工业工程,2007,10(6):42-45. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张正祥 陈志伟 郑冰冰 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学,管理学院,陕西,西安,710049 |
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| 摘 要： | 鉴于以往文献对现货市场供应链契约研究的不足,引入在现货市场的情况下买方占主导地位时供应链中双方的反应情况,建立Stackelberg博弈模型进行分析,并通过比较买卖双方签订与不签订契约带来的差异,找出期权契约对双方收益情况的影响,以供双方决策时参考.通过算例分析得出契约条件下参数的成立区间及买卖双方利益的增额.
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链契约 Stackelberg博弈 期权 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-7375（2007）06-0042-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-06-30 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年6月30日 |
Two-Stage Supply Chain Coordination by Contract with Options |
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| ZHANG Zheng-xiang,CHEN Zhi-wei,ZHENG Bing-bing.Two-Stage Supply Chain Coordination by Contract with Options[J].Industrial Engineering Journal,2007,10(6):42-45. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Zheng-xiang CHEN Zhi-wei ZHENG Bing-bing |
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| Abstract: | A model of option-based supply contract for the buyer is formulated based on the scenario that a spot market is existed and the buyer is a leader in the channel. The Stackelberg game model is analyzed according to each case, and the game equilibriums are gained in the complete information cases. In addition, the feasible range of current price in the spot market, such as an option-based contract, is constructed for the reference of the buyer and the seller. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain contract Stackelberg Game Theory options |
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