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委托-代理关系下风险投资者与投资家契约设计
引用本文:郑君君,钟红波,韩笑. 委托-代理关系下风险投资者与投资家契约设计[J]. 武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版), 2012, 34(2): 242-245
作者姓名:郑君君  钟红波  韩笑
作者单位:武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉,430072
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目
摘    要:在风险投资中,风险投资者与风险投资家之间存在委托-代理关系。针对风险投资者与风险投资家信息不对称的问题,风险投资者为了获得更大收益,会采用对自己更有利的契约来约束风险投资家。与传统模型相比,利用委托-代理理论,建立可观测变量,设计了一个比较完备的契约模型,可以激励风险投资家努力工作,有利于保护投资者利益。该契约还将风险投资者的收益与风险投资家的收益联系起来,在契约完备性较好的情况下,风险投资者和风险投资家都会获得更大收益,实现双赢的目的。

关 键 词:风险投资者  风险投资家  委托-代理  契约设计

Contract for Venture Investors and Venture Capitalists Based on the Principal -agent Relationship
ZHENG Junjun , ZHONG Hongbo , HAN Xiao. Contract for Venture Investors and Venture Capitalists Based on the Principal -agent Relationship[J]. Journal of Wuhan University of Technology(Information & Management Engineering), 2012, 34(2): 242-245
Authors:ZHENG Junjun    ZHONG Hongbo    HAN Xiao
Affiliation::Prof.;School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,430072,China.
Abstract:Principal-agent relationship exists in venture investors and venture capitalists in the venture investment.Because of the information asymmetry,in order to get more revenue,venture investors must design more lucrative contract to restrain venture capitalists.Compared with the traditional model,with the principal-agent theory,the observed variables were established and a relatively complete contract model was set up.It can encourage venture capitalists to work hard as well as to facilitate the protection for investors.The contract connected the revenue of venture investors to venture capitalists.In the completeness contract circumstances,venture investors and venture capitalists will get better revenue and realize the win-win purpose.
Keywords:venture investors  venture capitalists  principal-agent  design contracts
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