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电网公司双边垄断最优拍卖模型与分析
引用本文:胡恩同. 电网公司双边垄断最优拍卖模型与分析[J]. 电力系统保护与控制, 2005, 33(19): 45-49
作者姓名:胡恩同
作者单位:复旦大学中国经济研究中心,上海 200433
摘    要:我国实行“厂网分开、竞价上网”的电力改革中,形成了电网公司双边垄断模式。为与原有厂网合一、垂直一体化的完全垄断模式作效率比较,构造了国家电网公司双边垄断最优拍卖模型,深入分析了这种模式给电网公司、发电商和用电户带来的期望效用和社会福利水平及变化情况,结果证明改革后社会福利增加、效率提高,但仍未达到电力市场的社会最优。这表明应该坚持引入竞争的市场化改革方向,但需要打破电网公司双边垄断局面,进一步在发电、购电环节引入更充分的竞争。

关 键 词:双边垄断   拍卖   电力市场   优化
文章编号:1003-4897(2005)19-0045-05
收稿时间:2005-01-10
修稿时间:2005-03-31

An optimum auction model in the bilateral-monopolized power markets
Hu EnTong. An optimum auction model in the bilateral-monopolized power markets[J]. Power System Protection and Control, 2005, 33(19): 45-49
Authors:Hu EnTong
Abstract:As a result of the generation and the transmission of power is separated and the price is formed at a competitive market,a bilateral-monopolized market appears.To compare the efficiency with the totally monopolized original mode,this paper constructs a bilateral-monopoly auction model and analyzes the expected utility and social welfare level brought to the power transmission company,the power generator and the power consumer.It's proved that the social welfare and efficiency is improved,but is not optimum.It indicates that the market-based reform should be insisted on,but the bilateral monopoly at present is not still a optimum mode and needs to break the monopoly and strengthen the competition further in the power generating and purchasing.
Keywords:bilateral-monopoly    auction    power markets    optimization
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