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业主支付担保制度解决工程款拖欠的博弈论分析
引用本文:韩传峰,殷薇. 业主支付担保制度解决工程款拖欠的博弈论分析[J]. 建筑经济, 2006, 0(3)
作者姓名:韩传峰  殷薇
作者单位:同济大学经济与管理学院 上海200092
摘    要:近年来,我国工程建设领域业主拖欠工程款现象凸显.本文利用经济学原理,研究了工程业主违约欠款的内在动机和实行业主支付担保制度能够解决工程款拖欠的机理,为我国推行业主支付担保提供理论依据.

关 键 词:业主支付担保  信用  博弈论

Game Theory Analysis of the Resolve of Default Account Payable with Employer Payment Bond
HAN Chuan-feng,YIN Wei. Game Theory Analysis of the Resolve of Default Account Payable with Employer Payment Bond[J]. Construction Economy, 2006, 0(3)
Authors:HAN Chuan-feng  YIN Wei
Affiliation:HAN Chuan-feng YIN Wei
Abstract:During these years,employers default contractors account payable high frequently,and sometimes even for several years. Using theory of economics, this paper analyzes the immanent motivation of employers' breach of faith, and expatiates the mechanism that how employer payment bond resolves the problem that employers default contractors' due.All this provide frame of reference to put employer payment bond into practice in our country.
Keywords:employer payment bond  credit  game theory
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