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供应链订货与营销渠道协调的主从对策模型
引用本文:邱若臻,黄小原. 供应链订货与营销渠道协调的主从对策模型[J]. 工业工程与管理, 2007, 12(1): 25-28,44
作者姓名:邱若臻  黄小原
作者单位:东北大学,工商管理学院,沈阳,辽宁,110004;东北大学,工商管理学院,沈阳,辽宁,110004
基金项目:国家自然科学基金 , 高等学校博士学科点专项科研项目
摘    要:研究了供应链订货与营销渠道的协调问题,考虑了零售商具有订货成本缩减和营销投资成本,建立了供应链订货与营销渠道协调的Stackelberg主从对策模型.这一模型中,主方零售商具有产品零售价格和投资决策权,从方供应商具有产品批发价格决策权.分析了零售商四种投资策略,针对每种投资策略下的协调模型进行了数值仿真,结果表明在零售商订货成本缩减和营销之间进行投资协调能够同时增加零售商和供应商利润.

关 键 词:供应链  营销渠道  协调  斯坦博格主从对策
文章编号:1007-5429(2007)01-0025-04
修稿时间:2006-04-302006-08-20

The Stackelberg game models for ordering and marketing channel coordination in supply chain
Qiu Ruo-zhen,Huang Xiao-yuan. The Stackelberg game models for ordering and marketing channel coordination in supply chain[J]. Industrial Engineering and Management, 2007, 12(1): 25-28,44
Authors:Qiu Ruo-zhen  Huang Xiao-yuan
Abstract:The problem on supply chain ordering and marketing channel coordination is studied with the consideration of a retailer who has the ordering cost reducing and marketing investment,and the Stackelberg game models for ordering and marketing channel coordination in supply chain are developed.In these models,the retailer,as a leader,has the right to decide the retail price and investment decision,while the supplier,as a follower,has the right to decide the wholesale price.Four investment policies of retailer are analyzed and simulations are done aiming at each coordination model under each investment policy.The results show that adopting coordination between ordering cost reducing and marketing can both improve the retailer's and supplier's profits.
Keywords:supply chain   marketing channel   coordination   Stackelberg game
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