Extended KCI attack against two-party key establishment protocols |
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Authors: | Qiang Tang Liqun Chen |
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Affiliation: | a DIES, Faculty of EEMCS, University of Twente, The Netherlands b Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, Bristol, UK |
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Abstract: | We introduce an extended Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) attack against two-party key establishment protocols, where an adversary has access to both long-term and ephemeral secrets of a victim. Such an attack poses serious threats to both key authentication and key confirmation properties of a key agreement protocol, and it seems practical because the adversary could obtain the victim?s ephemeral secret in a number of methods; for example, by installing some Trojan horse into the victim?s computer platform or by exploiting the imperfectness of the pseudo-random number generator in the platform. We demonstrate that the 3-pass HMQV protocol, which is secure against the standard KCI attack, is vulnerable to this new attack. Furthermore, we show a countermeasure to prevent such an attack. |
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Keywords: | Cryptography Key establishment KCI attack Extended KCI attack |
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