Developmental Dynamics and Contemporary Evolutionary Psychology: Status Quo or Irreconcilable Views? Reply to Bjorklund (2003), Krebs (2003), Buss and Reeve (2003), Crawford (2003), and Tooby et al. (2003).

The authors address commentaries by D. F. Bjorklund (2003; see record 200309105-002); D. M. Buss and H. K. Reeve (2003; see record 200309105-004); C. B. Crawford (2003; see record 200309105-005); D. L. Krebs (2003; see record 2003-09105-003); and J. Tooby, L. Cosmides, and H. C. Barrett (2003; see record 2003-09105-006) on their analysis of the underlying assumptions of contemporary evolutionary psychology (R. Lickliter & H. Honeycutt, 2003; see record 200309105-001). The authors argue that evolutionary psychology currently offers no coherent framework for how to integrate genetic, environmental, and experiential factors into a theory of behavioral or cognitive phenotypes. The authors propose that this absence is due to a lack of developmental analysis in the major works of evolutionary psychology, resulting in an almost exclusive focus on adaptationist accounts of evolution by natural selection rather than a more broad-based focus on the process and products of evolution by epigenetic developmental dynamics. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)