不对称信息下中小企业融资博弈模型

根据我国中小企业融资中的信息不对称现象，结合不完全信息动态博弈及信息经济学的有关理论，建立了中小企业与金融机构之间的信号传递博弈模型，并进行了实例分析．分析结果表明，中小企业所发出的信号能够反映出中小企业的真实质量，金融机构也可以通过观测中小企业发出的信号来判断中小企业的预期盈利水平，并据此对其贷款申请做出正确的反应．

The game model in medium-small enterprise financing under asymmetric information

Focusing on the asymmetric information in the medium-small enterprises financing market, by applying the methodologies of incomplete information dynamic games and information economics, a signaling game model between medium-small enterprises and financing institutions is given and case analysis is conducted. The study shows that the signal can reveal the true qualities of medium-small enterprises, and the financial institutions can also deduce the future profit of medium-small enterprises and response to its loan application exactly according to the signal.