| 线性生产双方道德风险组织激励配置效率分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 孙树垒,孟秀丽. 线性生产双方道德风险组织激励配置效率分析[J]. 青岛建筑工程学院学报, 2010, 0(2): 112-117 |
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| 作者姓名： | 孙树垒 孟秀丽 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京财经大学管理科学与工程学院,南京210046 |
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| 基金项目： | 江苏省软科学项目（BR2008041;BR2008045）; 南京财经大学校级重点课题（B0805） |
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| 摘 要： | 给出了双方道德风险组织激励问题的基本分析框架,建立了完全信息、单方信息不对称和双方信息不对称等不同信息结构下双方道德风险组织激励问题的规划模型.以分析框架与规划模型为基础,引入线性生产函数,全面对比分析了不同信息结构下双方道德风险组织激励的均衡努力、最优契约和效用水平,揭示了线性生产双方道德风险组织激励效率配置的特点与规律.
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| 关 键 词： | 双方道德风险 配置效率 线性生产 最优契约 |
Allocation Efficiency of Incentive Problems in Linearly Productive Organization with Double-Sided Moral Hazard |
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| SUN Shu-lei,MENG Xiu-li. Allocation Efficiency of Incentive Problems in Linearly Productive Organization with Double-Sided Moral Hazard[J]. Journal of Qingdao Institute of Architecture and Engineering, 2010, 0(2): 112-117 |
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| Authors: | SUN Shu-lei MENG Xiu-li |
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| Affiliation: | (School of Management Science ＆ Engineering,NUFE,Nanjing 210046,China) |
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| Abstract: | A basic analytic framework for incentive problems with double-sided moral hazard is proposed,and the programming models for incentive problems with double-sided moral hazard under different information structures are constructed.Based on the analytic framework and the programming models,through introducing linear productive function into them,the equilibrium effort,optimal contract and utility level in incentive problems in linear productive organization with double-sided moral hazard are comparatively and comprehensively analyzed.This paper points out the characteristics and law of allocation efficiency in incentive problems in linear productive organization with double-sided moral hazard. |
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| Keywords: | double-sided moral hazard allocation efficiency linear production optimal contract |
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