石油工程项目管理机制

为了妥善处理石油工程项目中的委托-代理关系,研究了委托-代理模型和石油工程项目管理中的激励约束机制,分析了激励机制、监督机制和选择机制在石油工程项目运行管理中的重要性.只有用有效的契约去激励技术服务公司,才能使服务公司在追求自身效益最大化的同时也为实现石油公司的最大效益而尽最大努力;只有对技术服务公司的作业实施监督,才能形成对技术服务公司的有效约束;采用激励性承包方式、实施综合性评标和组建工程项目动态联盟能够防止逆向选择.分析表明,在最优激励安排下,激励强度与项目面临的不确定性、承包商的边际成本及其风险规避系数负相关,与承包商的边际生产率正相关,还与其他可观测变量相关.在最优监督水平下,作业公司的边际生产率越高,边际成本越低,越容易监督,监督带来的边际收益越高.对于那些监督比较困难的项目,可以通过加强惩罚力度的方式弥补难以有效监督的不足.激励性承包方式可以减小逆向选择造成的危害,组建动态联盟可以进一步加强激励作用,降低道德风险,解决逆向选择问题.参8

Petroleum engineering project management

The paper investigated principal-agent models and the incentive and restraint mechanism in the management of petroleum projects. The importance of the incentive,supervision and selection mechanism for petroleum project management was discussed.Service companies would not try their best to actualize oil companies' biggest benefits and adverse selection cannot be avoided unless oil majors use effective contracts to prompt contractors.Oil companies can't restrict service companies effectively unless they supervise the contractor's work.In the optimal contracts,incentive index is in the negative correlation with projects' uncertainty,contractor's marginal cost and its risk elusion coefficient,and it is in the positive correlation with contractor's marginal productivity.The factors influencing incentive index can assemble different types of contracts.In the optimal supervision level,when contractor's marginal productivity is high and marginal cost is low,it is easier to supervise and the marginal revenue of supervision is high.It is possible to offset the difficulty of monitoring by reinforcing punishment.Incentive contracts can decrease the harm of adverse selection.Construction of dynamic alliance can further strengthen incentive effect,reduce moral hazard and resolve adverse selection problems.