基于古诺博弈的容量补偿与容量持留比较

首先利用电力系统随机生产模拟技术，从理论上阐明了英国早期电力市场和当量电价的容量补偿基本原理。基于成本的分析表明，英国式的容量补偿主要考虑了机组强迫停运所引起的可靠性的容量价值补偿，而这一部分价值没有体现在能量市场规则中，所以补偿是必须的；当量电价除了补偿这部分价值外还包括了规模经济性依然存在所需要的补偿。然后构造了发电厂商采用容量持留策略的智能代理仿真模型，其中包括了能量主市场和备用辅助服务市场，进一步检验并比较了在寡头市场条件下这2种都具有容量补偿功能的市场运行特点。结果表明，在当量电价机制下，发电厂商没有实施容量持留行为的策略空间，并能引导出既自愿又充足的申报容量，且能维持市场电价的稳定。而在英国早期的电力市场中，发电厂商可以利用持留容量获得超额利润，同时造成申报容量的不足和市场电价的飞升，而且越是备用容量不足，发电厂商的这种市场力就越大。而造成这种结果的真正原因是统一出清电价本身，容量补偿方法对于激励或抑制发电商市场力的作用都相当有限。因此，在通常的寡头竞争市场，基于统一出清的英国容量补偿方法不具有市场的有效性和稳健性，而当量电价方法既能给予充分的容量回报，又具有良好的市场有效性和稳健性。

A Comparison Study on Capacity Payment and Capacity Withholding Based on the Cournot Game

The power system probabilistic production simulation is employed to illuminate the capacity value compensation principle for the early England electricity market and the probability electricity value equivalent (p-EVE) pricing method. The early English capacity compensation payment is long-term reliability capacity value compensation, but it is not included in the spot energy market, so it is necessary to be compensated. However, the p-EVE pricing method provides an automatic capacity value compensation for the scale of economy besides the reliability capacity value. In order to compare the impacts between the early England market rule and the p-EVE pricing method, an agent-based simulation model that the generation suppliers execute the withholding capacity bidding strategy in oligarchic market is developed. The results show that in the early England market, there is large space for the generators to withhold capacity to result in the bidding capacity deficient and market price spike, and the more generation capacity deficient, the more market power to execute. The investigations also show that the cause for the suppliers to withhold capacity is result from the uniform clearing pricing methods in the energy market rather than the capacity compensation rule; On the other hand, if the spot energy market employing the p-EVE pricing method, there is less space for the suppliers to withhold capacity to lead to the enough bidding capacity and hold the market price steady. At last the conclusion is made that in oligarchic market, the early England market which employ the uniform clearing pricing method cannot provide the robust and efficient market characteristic, while the p-EVE pricing method cannot only give the generation suppliers adequate return of the capacity investment, but also provide the robust and efficient market characteristic.