城中村改造中的“增长联盟”研究——以珠海市山场村为例

分析了我国城中村改造中参与主体的联盟、组织和作用机制等问题,指出当前我国城中村改造与城市更新的地方政治结构不同,解释城市更新的“增长联盟”框架不能直接套用到城中村改造中去:一方面,城中村改造突破了“增长联盟”的主体关系,投资方与原有村民结成了紧密的联盟关系,打破了原有政府权力和开发资本的联盟;另一方面,增长与反增长的边界变得模糊,在经济利益的影响下,不同参与主体倾向于选择性增长(介于增长与反增长之间)。以珠海市山场村改造为例,实证了上述研究发现,进一步完善和发展了原有的“增长联盟”理论。

GROWTH COALITION IN URBAN VILLAGE REDEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY ON SHANCHANG VILLAGE OF ZHUHAI CITY

Aiming at current issues of the coalition, organization, and mechanism of participants in urban village redevelopment, the paper points out that current local political structure is different between urban village redevelopment and urban renewal, and the framework of "growth coalition"cannot be directly applied to redevelopment of urban village. Firstly, the relationship of different stakeholders in the process of urban village redevelopment does not follow the rule of "growth coalition", because the investment parties and the original villagers have built close relationship in sharp contrast with the coalition of government and developers during urban renewal. Secondly, for economic interests, the existing relationship of growth coalition and anti-growth coalition has been blurred and different participants prefer selective growth.Taking Shanchang Village of Zhuhai in Guangdong as an example, this paper confirms the above findings, and further complements and develops the existing theory of "growth coalition".