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不对称信息下第四方物流配送时间契约设计
引用本文:徒君,黄敏.不对称信息下第四方物流配送时间契约设计[J].控制与决策,2016,31(8):1429-1434.
作者姓名:徒君  黄敏
作者单位:1. 辽宁工程技术大学优化与决策研究所,辽宁阜新123000;
2. 东北大学信息科学与工程学院,沈阳110004.
基金项目:

国家杰出青年科学基金项目(71325002, 61225012); 高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(20110042110024);流程工业综合自动化国家重点实验室基础科研业务费项目(2013ZCX11).

摘    要:

第四方物流与第三方物流构成委托代理关系, 信息不对称与风险规避为第四方物流配送时间契约设计带来了难题. 对此, 分别在集中式决策、对称成本信息和不对称成本信息3 种情景下进行研究, 给出最优配送时间契约, 并对最优契约结果进行分析. 实验结果表明: 最优契约能够实现对第三方物流的激励, 有效地管理物流配送时间; 同时, 不对称信息与风险规避均会降低系统表现. 数值实验说明了不对称信息与风险规避对最优配送时间契约的影响.



关 键 词:

第四方物流|第三方物流|配送时间|契约设计|不对称信息

收稿时间:2015/6/16 0:00:00
修稿时间:2015/11/13 0:00:00

Delivery time contract design under asymmetric information for fourth party logistics
TU Jun HUANG Min.Delivery time contract design under asymmetric information for fourth party logistics[J].Control and Decision,2016,31(8):1429-1434.
Authors:TU Jun HUANG Min
Abstract:

Fourth party logistics and third party logistics constitute a principal-agent relationship. Due to the asymmetric information and risk averse, it is difficult to design fourth party logistics delivery time contract, which is studied in the centralized decision-making, symmetric cost information and asymmetric cost information scenarios respectively. The optimal delivery time contract is obtained and the optimal results are analyzed. Results show that the optimal contract can incite the third party logistics, and manage the delivery time effectively. However, both the asymmetric information and risk averse can reduce the channel performance. The numerical experiment is given to show the effect of asymmetric information and risk averse on the optimal delivery time contract.

Keywords:

fourth party logistics|third party logistics|delivery time|contract design|asymmetric information

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