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| 基于广义解的双合作博弈收益分配模型 | |
| 引用本文： | 冯庆华 陈菊红 刘通. 基于广义解的双合作博弈收益分配模型[J]. 控制与决策, 2016, 31(4): 656-660 |
| 作者姓名： | 冯庆华 陈菊红 刘通 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 西安理工大学经济与管理学院，西安710054； 2. 西安财经学院信息学院，西安710100. |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目(71272117)；陕西省高校重点学科专项资金建设项目；陕西省教育厅科学研究计划项目(2013JK0234)；西安财经学院校级科研项目(13XCK12). |
| 摘 要： | 双合作博弈主要研究如何将联盟收益全部分配给双合作联盟的每个参与者. 考虑到不将全部的合作收益用于分配, 而是预留一部分合作收益用于投资扩大再生产或再分配的情况, 对双合作博弈模型进行扩展, 定义广义分配、广义核心和广义韦伯集等解的概念, 并证明广义核心总是包含在广义韦伯集中. 当双合作博弈满足超模性时, 广义核心总是等于广义韦伯集. 由于广义韦伯集是一个非空集合, 从而进一步证明了广义核心存在且非空. |
| 关 键 词： | 双合作博弈|双超模博弈|广义核心|广义韦伯集 |
| 收稿时间： | 2015-01-08 |
| 修稿时间： | 2015-06-17 |
Model of profit allocation based on generalized solution in bicooperative game |
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| FENG Qing-hua CHEN Ju-hong LIU Tong. Model of profit allocation based on generalized solution in bicooperative game[J]. Control and Decision, 2016, 31(4): 656-660 | |
| Authors: | FENG Qing-hua CHEN Ju-hong LIU Tong |
| Abstract: | The bicooperative game mainly studies how the bicoalition profit completely distributes to each of the participants of the bicoalition. Considering that the total profit is left undistributed to invest and enlarge reproduction or redistribution, the bicooperation game is promoted based on the solution defination of generalized imputation, generalized core and generalized weber set. It is proved that the generalized core is always included in the generalized Weber set. The generalized core of the bisupermodular game is always equal to the generalized weber set. Because the general weber set is a nonempty set, it is proved that the generalized core exists and is not empty. |
| Keywords: | bicooperative game|bisupermodular game|generalized core|generalized weber set |
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