| 发电市场中的合谋与规制 |
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| 引用本文： | 姚智斌. 发电市场中的合谋与规制[J]. 江苏电机工程, 2005, 24(6): 61-64 |
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| 作者姓名： | 姚智斌 |
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| 作者单位： | 江苏省国信集团,江苏,南京,210005 |
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| 摘 要： | 分析了电力市场的基本特征，运用古诺模型对电力市场特征引发的发电商行为效应进行分析，指出利润最大化的动机促使电力市场中以合谋为表现形式的策略性行为产生.在归纳了电力市场竞争价格形成区间后，初步研究了对合谋的分类治理原则。
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| 关 键 词： | 电力市场 合谋 策略行为 市场力 规制对策 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-0665（2005）06-0061-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-08-18 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-08-182005-09-20 |
Collusion and Regulation Measures in Power Generation Market |
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| YAO Zhi-bin. Collusion and Regulation Measures in Power Generation Market[J]. Jiangsu Electrical Engineering, 2005, 24(6): 61-64 |
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| Authors: | YAO Zhi-bin |
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| Affiliation: | Jiangsu Provincial Guoxin Group, Nanj ing 210005, China |
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| Abstract: | Major features of power market are analyzed, and Cournot-model is used to describe the behavior effectiveness induced by market features. The motive of profit-maximizing results in collusion ,which is one of the tactic actions in power market is introduced. The classified regulation countermeasures are described after a brief conclusion upon market pricing constitution. |
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| Keywords: | electric power market collusion tactic action market power regulation measures |
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