公路工程LCC 设计—施工联合体重复博弈分析

针对单次项目合作中设计方和施工方存在的利益冲突问题，基于全寿命周期项目中的成本优化考量，通过构建设计 —施工两参与方的重复博弈模型，运用博弈理论分析重复博弈下影响两参与方的策略选择组合的条件并计算出基于未来利益的贴现系数。通过对无限次重复博弈模型的求解确立了两参与方策略组合趋于“帕累托最优解”的贴现条件，并据此提出了信息化条件下公路工程全寿命周期的优化管理流程。结合仿真研究结果表明，无限次重复博弈模型中，设计和施工双方出于长远利益考虑，会做出“利他”的策略选择，且从流程上有利于公路类线性工程节约后期改扩、建的勘察费用。此结论可以为公路工程全寿命周期新型管理模式提供参考，在重复博弈的机制约束下实现项目双方的高效合作和成本优化。

Repeated Game Analysis on Highway Engineering Projects Using LCC Design-construction Consortium

In view of the conflict of interests between the designer and the constructor in single project cooperation, based on the cost optimization consideration in the whole life cycle project, the repeated game model of the design-construction participants is developed. The game theory is used to analyze the conditions that affect the strategic choice combination of the two participants under the repeated game, and the discount coefficient based on future interests is calculated. By solving the infinite repeated game model, the discount condition that the strategic combination of the two participants tends to "Pareto optimal solution" is established, and based on this, the optimal management process of highway engineering life cycle under the informatization condition is put forward. Combined with the simulation results, it is shown that in the infinite repeated game model, both design and construction parties will make "altruistic" strategic choices for the sake of long-term interests, and it is beneficial to save the investigation cost of linear highway engineering in the later period. This conclusion can provide a reference for the new management mode of highway engineering life cycle, and realize the efficient cooperation and cost optimization of both parties under the constraint of repeated game mechanism.