首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

移动P2P网络基于博弈论方法的协作激励机制
引用本文:牛新征,周明天,佘堃.移动P2P网络基于博弈论方法的协作激励机制[J].计算机应用,2008,28(7):1823-1827.
作者姓名:牛新征  周明天  佘堃
作者单位:电子科技大学,计算机科学与工程学院,成都,610054
摘    要:在移动P2P网络中,部分自私的移动节点只是大量地消耗已有网络资源而不提供自己的资源。考虑到移动P2P网络的资源有限性以及部分节点具有自私行为的特点,提出了一种基于博弈论的协作激励机制。该机制根据移动节点的不同贡献大小来提供不同网络服务质量,最大限度地鼓励了每个移动节点参与协作和共享。同时,详细描述和分析了协作激励机制中的网络资源分配策略,并且证明了该协作激励机制的博弈存在一个稳定的纳什(Nash)均衡。通过仿真实验发现,该激励机制有效地激发了移动节点间的协作,优化了整个网络的性能。同现有的协作激励策略相比,提高了数据包转发率等。

关 键 词:移动P2P网络  资源分配  博弈论  纳什(Nash)均衡  激励机制
收稿时间:2008-01-14
修稿时间:2008-03-07

Cooperative incentive mechanism based on game theory in mobile P2P networks
NIU Xin-zheng,ZHOU Ming-tian,SHE Kun.Cooperative incentive mechanism based on game theory in mobile P2P networks[J].journal of Computer Applications,2008,28(7):1823-1827.
Authors:NIU Xin-zheng  ZHOU Ming-tian  SHE Kun
Affiliation:NIU Xin-zheng,ZHOU Ming-tian,SHE Kun(School of Computer Science , Engineering,University of Electronic Science , Technology of China,Chengdu Sichuan 610054,China)
Abstract:Many selfish mobile peers consume much resource without any contribution in mobile P2P network. Considering the limitation of network resource and selfishness of peers, this paper proposed a cooperative incentive mechanism based on game theory. The mechanism provided peers with different network's service quality according to their contribution and therefore every peer was encouraged to cooperate with others or share their resource. This paper described and analyzed the resource allocation policy of cooperative incentive mechanism in detail. Besides, the existence of the steady Nash equilibrium in the game was also proven. Simulation and analysis results show that the incentive mechanism can encourage the cooperation among the peers and improve the network performance efficiently. Compared with current cooperative incentive mechanism, the mechanism can increase forwarding ratio of the packet.
Keywords:mobile P2P(Peer-to-Peer) network  resource allocation  game theory  Nash equilibrium  incentive mechanism
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《计算机应用》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《计算机应用》下载全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号