A framework for explaining reliance on decision aids |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), P.O. Box 23, 3769 ZG Soesterberg, The Netherlands;2. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081a, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands;1. Cognitive Science Team, United States Army Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center, 15 Kansas St., Natick, MA 01760, USA;2. Center for Applied Brain & Cognitive Sciences, 200 Boston Ave., Medford, MA 02155, USA;3. Department of Psychology, Tufts University, 490 Boston Avenue, Medford, MA 02155, USA;1. Centre for Health Informatics, City University, London, United Kingdom;2. School of Health Information Science, University of Victoria, Victoria, Canada;3. Leeds Institute of Health Sciences, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom;1. Old Dominion University, VA, USA;2. Leidos, OH, USA |
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| Abstract: | This study presents a framework for understanding task and psychological factors affecting reliance on advice from decision aids. The framework describes how informational asymmetries in combination with rational, motivational and heuristic factors explain human reliance behavior. To test hypotheses derived from the framework, 79 participants performed an uncertain pattern learning and prediction task. They received advice from a decision aid either before or after they expressed their own prediction, and received feedback about performance. When their prediction conflicted with that of the decision aid, participants had to choose to rely on their own prediction or on that of the decision aid. We measured reliance behavior, perceived and actual reliability of self and decision aid, responsibility felt for task outcomes, understandability of one's own reasoning and of the decision aid, and attribution of errors. We found evidence that (1) reliance decisions are based on relative trust, but only when advice is presented after people have formed their own prediction; (2) when people rely as much on themselves as on the decision aid, they still perceive the decision aid to be more reliable than themselves; (3) the less people perceive the decision aid's reasoning to be cognitively available and understandable, the less people rely on the decision aid; (4) the more people feel responsible for the task outcome, the more they rely on the decision aid; (5) when feedback about performance is provided, people underestimate both one's own reliability and that of the decision aid; (6) underestimation of the reliability of the decision aid is more prevalent and more persistent than underestimation of one's own reliability; and (7) unreliability of the decision aid is less attributed to temporary and uncontrollable (but not external) causes than one's own unreliability. These seven findings are potentially applicable for the improved design of decision aids and training procedures. |
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