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电力信息物理系统低代价多阶段高危攻击策略研究
引用本文:蔡晔,刘放,曹一家,陈洋,刘颖.电力信息物理系统低代价多阶段高危攻击策略研究[J].电力系统自动化,2021,45(20):1-8.
作者姓名:蔡晔  刘放  曹一家  陈洋  刘颖
作者单位:湖南省2011清洁能源与智能电网协同创新中心(长沙理工大学),湖南省长沙市 410114
基金项目:国家自然科学基金联合基金资助项目(U1966207);湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(2020JJ5573);国家自然科学基金资助项目(51807010)。
摘    要:信息物理层间的深度融合是智能电网的重要特征.利用跨域关系实施的攻击会给电网稳定运行带来新的风险,考虑攻击代价因素研究高危攻击策略对于提升电网抵御攻击的能力具有重要意义.首先,基于电力信息物理层间耦合关系,综合结构特性与运行特性定义了一种线路攻击代价指标,以辨识电网中防护措施薄弱而容易遭受攻击的低攻击代价线路.然后,对低攻击代价线路进行多阶段攻击以诱发大停电事故,分析信息物理交互作用下多阶段攻击的危害放大机理.最后,以IEEE 118节点系统和某省电网系统为例进行仿真分析.仿真结果表明:针对低攻击代价线路实施多阶段攻击可造成大停电事故,且攻击代价明显较低;信息节点故障概率的增加使得攻击策略有效性提高,信息网在预防大停电事故中发挥着重要作用.

关 键 词:信息物理系统  攻击代价  多阶段攻击  连锁故障  优化调度
收稿时间:2021/3/18 0:00:00
修稿时间:2021/6/7 0:00:00

Research on Low-cost Multi-stage High-risk Attack Strategy for Power Cyber-Physical System
CAI Ye,LIU Fang,CAO Yijia,CHEN Yang,LIU Ying.Research on Low-cost Multi-stage High-risk Attack Strategy for Power Cyber-Physical System[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2021,45(20):1-8.
Authors:CAI Ye  LIU Fang  CAO Yijia  CHEN Yang  LIU Ying
Affiliation:Hunan Province 2011 Collaborative Innovation Center of Clean Energy and Smart Grid (Changsha University of Science & Technology), Changsha 410114, China
Abstract:The deep integration of the cyber layer and the physical layer is an important feature of a smart grid. Attacks carried out using cross-domain relationships bring new risks to the stable operation of the power grid. It is of great significance to study the high-risk attack strategy for improving the ability of power grids to resist attacks considering the attack cost factors. Firstly, based on the coupling relationship between cyber layer and physical layer, an index of line attack cost is defined by combining the structure characteristics and operation characteristics, so as to identify the low-attack-cost lines with weak protection measures in the power grid, which are vulnerable to attacks. Then, the multi-stage attacks on low-attack-cost lines are carried out to induce blackouts, and the damage amplification mechanism of the multi-stage attack under the interaction of cyber and physical systems is analyzed. Finally, an IEEE 118-bus system and a provincial power system are taken as examples for simulation analysis. Simulation results show that multi-stage attacks on low-attack-cost lines can cause blackouts,and the attack cost is obviously lower; the increase of failure probability of information nodes will improve the effectiveness of the attack strategy, and information network plays an important role in preventing blackouts.
Keywords:cyber-physical system  attack cost  multi-stage attack  cascading failure  optimal scheduling
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