基于博弈论的网络服务提供商出口检测策略分析

网络服务提供商(ISP)作为网络信息的汇聚者和分发者是最佳的网络病毒防御方。但ISP出于对成本和代价的考虑,通常只检测流入信息而忽略流出信息。为此,对ISP在整个网络中所采取的安全措施进行了分析,提出了出口检测策略,以期对ISP进行策略选择提供参考。该方法的主要思路为:首先,建立了ISP与攻击者之间的博弈模型和网络病毒传播模型;其次,在考虑网络病毒动态传播的情况下,分析了ISP的出口检测策略变化对病毒传播的影响。理论分析表明:当不采取出口检测时,ISP自身被入侵的风险会增大;当采取出口检测时,不仅ISP自身的收益会提高,而且有助于提高整个网络的安全性。通过Matlab仿真实验验证了理论分析的正确性。

Analysis of egress detection strategy of Internet service provider based on game theory

Internet Service Provider (ISP), as the convergers and distributors of network information, is the best network virus defender. However, ISP usually would like to detect the ingress information while ignoring the egress information according to the cost. The security measures for ISP in the whole network were analyzed and the strategy of egress detection was presented to provide reference for ISP's selection of strategies. First, the game model between ISP and attackers and the spreading model of network virus were proposed. Secondly, the impacts of the strategies selected by ISP on the spreading of virus were analyzed when the dynamical spreading of network virus was considered. The results show that ISP will face an increase in invasion risk when it does not take egress detection, however the adoption of egress detection can improve not only the ISP's own utility, but also the security of the whole network. The validity of the theoretical results was verified by Matlab simulation.