考虑公平关切的双渠道供应链平台合作决策

为探讨制造商与转销型以及与代销型平台的合作问题，应用制造商主导下的Stackelberg博弈模型针对零售商具有横向、纵向和双向3种公平关切情况的供应链进行决策分析。以算例形式比较不同公平关切系数对供应链成员定价及利润的影响情况，进一步讨论制造商的平台选择策略。研究表明，零售商公平关切倾向并不总是有利于提高自身的利润；从绝对利润来看，横向公平关切越大，对于与转销型平台合作的制造商更有利；纵向公平关切越大，制造商与代运营型平台合作更有利。从相对利润来看，高横向−低纵向公平关切下，制造商倾向于与转销型平台合作；低横向−高纵向公平关切下，制造商倾向于与代销型平台合作。

Pricing Strategy of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Fairness Concern under Platform Differences

In order to discuss the cooperation between the manufacturer and the reselling platform and the agency selling platform, a Stackelberg game model led by the manufacturer is applied to analyze the decision-making of the supply chain when the retailer has horizontal fairness concern, vertical fairness concern and bidirectional fairness concerns. An example is given to compare the effects of different fairness concerns on pricing strategies and profits of supply chain members, and the platform selection strategies of the manufacturer are further discussed. The research shows that the tendency of retailers to be concerned about fairness is not always conducive to improving their own profits. From the perspective of absolute profit, the greater the horizontal fairness concern is, the more favorable it is for the manufacturer to cooperate with reselling platform. The greater the vertical fairness concern is, the better for the manufacturer working with agency selling platform. From the perspective of relative profit, the manufacturer tends to cooperate with reselling platform under high horizontal fairness concern and low vertical fairness concern while the manufacturer tends to partner with agency selling platform under low horizontal fairness concern and high vertical fairness concern.