存在多委托人条件下考虑溢出效应的重大工程多任务激励模型

在存在工程业主和政府部门作为委托人的情形下，考虑多任务之间存在的溢出效应构建激励模型，在共同代理和独家代理模式下， 分别讨论参与各方的策略与收益。 结果表明，由于溢出效应的存在，政府部门参与激励机制设计，可以使得工程业主和政府部门的收益相较于独家代理模式均得以提高；工程业主也乐于提供更高的激励系数，以刺激项目管理机构付出更多努力；项目管理机构在承接政府部门的任务后，提高了经济效益和声誉， 对来自工程业主的建设任务也产生了正向的溢出效应。建立了多委托人的激励模型，为项目管理机构协调完成工程建设任务和社会责任提供了理论依据。

Multi-task Incentive Mode of Mega Projects Considering the SpilloverEffect Under the Condition of Multi Principals

In the case of project owners and government departments as principals， this study considers the spillover effect betweenmulti tasks， constructs a principal-agent model. Strategies and benefits of involved parties are discussed under the common agencymode and exclusive dealing mode. The results show that because of the positive spillover effect， the government departments’participation in the design of incentive mechanism can improve the income of project owners and government departments comparedwith the exclusive dealing mode. Project owners are willing to provide higher incentive coefficient to stimulate project managementorganizations to make more efforts. Project management organizations improve their economic remuneration， reputation， and utilityafter undertaking the tasks of government departments. Meanwhile， the project management organizations are willing to make moreefforts under more active incentives. This research establishes a multi-task principal-agent model which considers the projectmanagement organizations and government department as multi principals， providing a theoretical basis for the project managementorganizations to fulfill its social responsibility.