基于利益相关者理论的 IDI 制度下三方博弈分析

工程质量潜在缺陷保险（IDI）成为解决住宅工程质量潜在缺陷的有效手段。目前我国 IDI 制度还在试点探索阶段，相关利益主体的协作关系还未明晰，配套的保障体系也未健全。基于利益相关者理论对 IDI 制度下参与住宅工程建设、保修与行政管理的建设单位、保险公司和政府三方利益主体进行博弈分析，建立了“建设单位-保险公司-政府”博弈模型，并求其均衡解，进而探究三方主体策略选择及其影响因素，明晰三者间相互促进及相互制约关系，并提出 IDI 制度良性运行的制度补偿方案。结果表明:政府对保险的补贴金额及对建设单位的补贴比例、保险公司管理成本、质量保险赔付额、工程质量潜在缺陷保险保费、建设单位的投保概率等因素会影响三方的策略选择。通过采取保险强制措施、优化 IDI 产品设计、建立完善保险体系等手段能有效地改进各个主体的行为，从而全面提升建筑行业的工程质量。

Game Analysis of Three Parties Under IDI System Based on Stakeholder Theory

Inherent Defects Insurance（IDI）has become an effective means to solve the potential defects of residential engineeringquality. At present，China’s IDI system is still in the pilot exploration stage，the collaborative relationship of relevant interest subjectsis not yet clear，and the supporting guarantee system is not yet sound. Based on the stakeholder theory，this paper analyzes the gameamong the three stakeholders of IDI system:the contractor，insurance company and government. The game model of "constructionunit-insurance company-government" is established and seeks its equilibrium solution. Then, the strategy choice of the threestakeholders and its influence are explored. Finally，this research proposes a compensation scheme for the healthy operation of IDIsystem. The research results show that the amount of government subsidies for insurance and the proportion of subsidies forcontractors，the management cost of insurance companies，the amount of quality insurance payout，the insurance premium forpotential defects in construction quality，the probability of insurance for construction units，and other factors affect the strategicchoices of three parties. By adopting insurance compulsory measures，optimizing IDI product design，and establishing a perfectinsurance system，the behavior of each subject can be effectively improved，so as to comprehensively enhance the project quality inthe construction industry.