| 基于委托代理的工程监理寻租行为博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 完世伟,曹玉贵,杨忠直.基于委托代理的工程监理寻租行为博弈分析[J].工业工程,2006,9(4):46-48,59. |
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| 作者姓名： | 完世伟 曹玉贵 杨忠直 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072
2. 上海交通大学,管理学院,上海,200052 |
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| 摘 要： | 在综合分析工程监理制度下业主、工程监理和承包商相互作用关系的基础上,根据公共寻租理论,分析了工程监理与承包商之间的寻租动机;基于委托-代理理论,运用博弈论的方法建立了业主、工程监理与承包商之间的三方博弈模型,并对工程监理与承包商之间的寻租行为进行了博弈分析;基于博弈分析结果,对有效治理工程监理和承包商之间的寻租活动提出了政策建议.
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 工程监理 寻租 博弈分析 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-7375（2006）04-0046-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-01-24 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-01-24 |
Game Analysis of Rent-Seeking of Engineering Supervisors Based on Principal-Agents |
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| WAN Shi-wei,CAO Yu-gui,YANG Zhong-zhi.Game Analysis of Rent-Seeking of Engineering Supervisors Based on Principal-Agents[J].Industrial Engineering Journal,2006,9(4):46-48,59. |
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| Authors: | WAN Shi-wei CAO Yu-gui YANG Zhong-zhi |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2. School of Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200030, China |
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| Abstract: | With the analysis of the relationship among employers, engineering supervisors and contractors, public rent-seeking theory is employed to investigate the motive of rent-seeking between engineering supervisors and contractors. Based on principal-agent theory, this paper establishes a three-person game model for employers, engineering, supervisors and contractors, discusses the rent-seeking with some suggestions. |
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| Keywords: | principal-agent engineering supervisor rent-seeking game analysis |
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