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插入随机时延的高阶旁路攻击防御方法
引用本文:张涛,范明钰.插入随机时延的高阶旁路攻击防御方法[J].计算机工程,2008,34(16):162-164.
作者姓名:张涛  范明钰
作者单位:电子科技大学计算机科学与工程学院,成都,610054;电子科技大学计算机科学与工程学院,成都,610054
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目
摘    要:旁路攻击是一种新的密码分析方法,现有的密码算法仍然容易遭受高阶旁路攻击。分析旁路信息的泄露模型与高阶攻击模型,针对AES算法的安全实现,提出一种插入随机时延的高阶攻击防御方法。该方法通过插入随机的冗余指令,降低了内部运算与泄露信息之间的相关性,从而使统计攻击无法成功。通过仿真实验证实该方法能有效地防御高阶旁路攻击。

关 键 词:密码芯片  高阶旁路攻击  AES算法  随机时延  能量攻击
修稿时间: 

Resistant to Higher-order Side-channel Attack by Inserting Random Delay
ZHANG Tao,FAN Ming-yu.Resistant to Higher-order Side-channel Attack by Inserting Random Delay[J].Computer Engineering,2008,34(16):162-164.
Authors:ZHANG Tao  FAN Ming-yu
Affiliation:(College of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054)
Abstract:Side-channel attack is a new cryptanalysis, and the current cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to higher-order side-channel attack. The leakage model and adversary model are introduced, a new countermeasure based on inserting random delay is proposed to secure AES against higher-order side-channel attack. By inserting a redundant instruction, it is expected to reduce the correlation between the leakage and the inside operations, and thus make the statistic analysis infeasible. Simulation verifies the efficiency of the proposed method.
Keywords:cryptographic chips  higher-order side-channel attack  Advanced Encryption Standard(AES) algorithm  random delay  power attack
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