| 电力市场运营中卖方串谋动机分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 俞晓红. 电力市场运营中卖方串谋动机分析[J]. 华东电力, 2007, 35(3): 45-48 |
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| 作者姓名： | 俞晓红 |
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| 作者单位： | 华东电网有限公司,上海,200002 |
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| 摘 要： | 根据我国电力市场的需求特征,应用经济学的委托代理理论,构建了相应的博弈论模型,应用发电厂商收益函数模型,对不存在转移支付和存在转移支付的发电侧默契作了具体分析,最后得出结论,即最高限价和分散机组分布是遏制发电厂商,在决定发电量和发电报价中恶性默契的有力举措.
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| 关 键 词： | 发电 输电 串谋 管制 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-9529(2007)03-0045-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-08-22 |
Collusion motivations of sellers in electricity markets |
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| YU Xiao-hong. Collusion motivations of sellers in electricity markets[J]. East China Electric Power, 2007, 35(3): 45-48 |
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| Authors: | YU Xiao-hong |
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| Abstract: | Based on the demands of Chinese electricity market and the Primcipalagent theory of Economics,the relevant Game theory was constructed.The profit function models for power suppliers were used to analyze the privities of power suppliers when there exists transfer payment and when there is no transfer payment among them.It is proposed that price capping and power generating unit dispersing are two effective methods to preclude collusions of power suppliers in power generation and price bidding. |
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| Keywords: | power generation power transmission collusion regulation game |
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