碳限额交易政策下寄售契约对两级可持续供应链的协调

考虑消费者具有低碳偏好,在环境保护和经济利益的双重驱动下,制造商对生产环节和销售环节进行减排技术投资,如引进减排设备或技术.以包含单个制造商和单个零售商的两级可持续供应链为研究对象,基于碳限额交易政策,首先研究寄售契约对该供应链的协调效果;然后探究制造商应如何理性地选择减排技术投资方式,即应该在生产环节和销售环节均进行减排技术投资还是仅在生产环节减排技术投资;最后通过算例分析对理论结果进行验证,并运用田口实验对参数进行鲁棒性分析和优化.研究表明,当政府规定的碳限额高于某一阈值时,利润损失率低于25%,寄售契约能够实现较好的协调效果.此外,与仅在生产环节进行减排投资相比,在生产和销售环节均进行减排投资不仅减排水平提高,而且系统总利润和制造商利润增大.

Two-echelon sustainable supply chain coordination with consignment contract under cap-and-trade regulation

Taking into account the consumer has a low carbon preferences, under the dual driving force of environment production and economic benefit, the manufacturer invests in the emission reduction technology in the production process and sales process, such as introducing the emission reduction equipment or cleaner production technology. For a two-echelon sustainable supply chain that includes single manufacturer and single retailer, this paper studies the coordination efficiency of consignment contract on this supply chain under cap-and-trade regulation. And then we explore that how the manufacturer rationally chooses the way of investment in emission reduction, i.e., whether the manufacturer should invest in production and sales processes or only in the production sector. Finally, a numerical example is undertaken to illustrate the theoretical results, and the robustness analysis and optimization of the parameters are carried out by using the Taguchi method. It is found that when the carbon cap is stipulated by the government is higher than a threshold, the profit loss rate is less than 25%, and the consignment contract can achieve better coordination. In addition, compared with the emission reduction investment only in the production process, investment in both production and sales sectors is more sustainable and profitable.