可证明安全的WLAN Mesh接入认证协议

针对目前WLAN Mesh安全解决方案中,一个新的Mesh设备在接入时要与其邻居及认证服务器之间进行两次802.1X认证和两次四步握手,大大增加了设备的接入时间和复杂性的问题,基于Diffie-Hellman密钥交换,采用签名认证方式,提出了一种新的接入认证协议。新的协议只需要四轮的协议交互便可以实现上述三者之间的相互认证和密钥确认,而不需要四步握手进行密钥确认。在DDH假定成立的前提下,新的协议在扩展模型中是可证明安全的,并且通信效率和计算效率都优于现有方案。

Provable secure authentication protocol for WLAN mesh

For the problem that a new mesh point accesses to WLAN meshes networks needs two executions of authentication protocol 802. 11x and four-way handshakes among supplicant, authenticator and authentication server, which would increase communication and computation casts in WLAN mash security solutions, an authentication protocol with signature based authentication model was proposed by using Diffie-Hellman key exchange technique. Four turns protocol interactions in the new protocol mutual authentication and key confirmation among supplicant, authenticator and authentication server can be realized with no handshake required. Finally, the analysis results show that the proposed protocol proves to be secure under DDH assumption and better than current solutions.