| Abstract: | Proposes that children do poorly on reasoning from premises of the form if p then q not because they construe if as a biconditional but rather because they use discourse comprehension processes that lead them to accept the invited inferences if not p then not q and if q then p. This hypothesis predicts that children should respond appropriately to premises in which the invited inferences are countermanded. In Exp I, 24 undergraduates and 44 10-yr-olds were given conditional reasoning problems. Some of these had a major premise consisting of a single if–then sentence, while others had a more elaborate major premise in which the invited inferences were explicitly countermanded. In Exp II, Ss were 24 undergraduates, 20 10-yr-olds, and 34 7-yr-olds. In some problems the major premise consisted of a single if–then statement; in others, the major premise consisted of 3 such statements, 2 of which shared the same consequent, thus implicitly countermanding the invited inferences. In both experiments, all age groups committed the fallacies in the simple condition but not in the more complex condition. It is concluded that children's representation of if distinguishes necessary from merely invited inferences. Data suggest a collection of countermandable context-dependent inferences of varying degrees of invitingness associated with if. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved) |
