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扫描电压对硬件木马检测影响分析
引用本文:魏佩,李少青,陈吉华,倪林. 扫描电压对硬件木马检测影响分析[J]. 信息网络安全, 2014, 0(7): 7-11
作者姓名:魏佩  李少青  陈吉华  倪林
作者单位:国防科学技术大学计算机学院,湖南长沙410073
基金项目:“核高基”国家重大专项[2012ZX01027004-003]
摘    要:硬件木马是一种微小而隐蔽的恶意电路,它隐藏在目标芯片中,在一定条件下实施对目标芯片输入输出节点状态或功能的恶意修改。随着集成电路设计生产全球化的不断加剧,芯片设计与生产环节的分离增加了芯片被植入硬件木马的可能性,给芯片的安全性与可靠性带来了极大的威胁。因此,如何检测被测芯片是否含有硬件木马,确保集成电路芯片安全变得日益重要。文章基于40nm 工艺库下,对高级加密标准 AES 算法的网表中设计植入相对于无木马AES 电路大小为2.7%的信息窃取型硬件木马,并与无木马 AES 电路作为 Golden 参考模型进行对比,通过分析 PVT(工艺、电压、温度)参数中不同工作电压对电路旁路功耗信息影响的规律,发现由工作电压抖动而引起的功耗噪声可以淹没由硬件木马的植入而引入功耗信息,进而降低硬件木马检测效率,在此基础上文章提出一种基于随机扫描电压叠加的硬件木马旁路功耗信息的显化方法,规避了在常规硬件木马检测时电压波动对硬件木马的检测影响,实现对硬件木马的检测。

关 键 词:芯片安全  硬件木马  旁路分析  扫描电压

The Analysis of Hardware Trojan Detection based on Scanning Voltage
WEI Pei,LI Shao-qing,CHEN Ji-hua,NI Lin. The Analysis of Hardware Trojan Detection based on Scanning Voltage[J]. Netinfo Security, 2014, 0(7): 7-11
Authors:WEI Pei  LI Shao-qing  CHEN Ji-hua  NI Lin
Affiliation:(College of Computer, National Universify of Defense Technology, Changsha Hunan 410073, China)
Abstract:Hardware Trojan is a malicious circuit which is so tiny and covert, masking in the chip to modify the inputs and outputs’ nodes status or function of the target chip. With the increasing globalization of the design and fabrication of integrated circuits(ICs), it makes the chips easier to be inserted Hardware Trojans due to the separation of the design and production processes, which leads to the huge threat of the ICs’ security and reliability. How to detect whether the test chip containing the Hardware Trojan to ensure safety of the integrated circuits is becoming more and more important. The authors designed a kind of theft-type Hardware Trojan in the netlist of the AES encryption algorithm based on 40-nm standard cell libraries, and the size of the Hardware Trojan was about 2.7% compared with the Golden pure AES circuit (Trojan-free), then the design was analyzed through different operating voltages of the parameter of the PVT (process & voltage & temperature), which caused the different laws of the side-channel power consumption, we have found that the verification of the side-channel power consumption caused by the implanting Hardware Trojan could be overwhelmed by the working voltage jitter, so that reduced the Hardware Trojan detection efficiency. Based on the article, we present a method to manifest the side-channel power consumption of the Hardware Trojan based on the random scanning voltage, which circumvent the effects of the verification of side-channel power consumption due to the voltage fluctuation in the normal Hardware Trojan detection, and achieve the goal of the Hardware Trojan’s detection.
Keywords:AES  chip-security  hardware trojan  side-channel analysis  scanning voltage  AES
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