| 信息不完全下的组合仲裁 |
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| 引用本文： | 郭文革,陈.信息不完全下的组合仲裁[J].自动化学报,1998,24(1):56-63. |
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| 作者姓名： | 郭文革 陈 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.上海交通大学系统工程研究所,上海; |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学青年基金,中国博士后科学基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于争议双方对仲裁人的裁决值有不同概率估计这一前提分析组合仲裁.构造了它
的非合作对策模型.然后利用此模型,在多种情形下探讨了Nash均衡报价策略的存在性,得
出了组合仲裁不能诱导争议双方报价收敛的结论,这与Brams和Merrll Ⅱ在争议双方对裁
决值有相同概率估计前提下获得的著名结论正好相反.最后分析了当一方变得风险厌恶时,
对争议双方报价的影响.
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| 关 键 词： | 仲裁 协商 不完全信息 非合作对策 Nash均衡 |
| 收稿时间： | 1994-5-18 |
Combined Arbitraiton with Incomplete Information |
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| GUO WENGE,CHEN TING.Combined Arbitraiton with Incomplete Information[J].Acta Automatica Sinica,1998,24(1):56-63. |
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| Authors: | GUO WENGE CHEN TING |
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| Affiliation: | 1.Institute of Systems Engineering,Shanghai Jiaotong University,Shanghai;Institute of System Engineering,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan |
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| Abstract: | Based on the assumption that both disputants have different probability estimations
to arbitrator's decision, combined arbitration is analyzed and a non-cooperative game with incomplete
information is constructed. Existence of Nash equilibrium offer strategy is discussed
for several cases, and the conclusion that combined arbitration can't give the disputants an incentive
to converge is achieved. Finally, we analyze the effect on both disputants offers when
one of them becomes risk aversion. |
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| Keywords: | Nash equilibrium arbitration bargaining incomplete information non cooperative games |
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