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"医药合谋"内在机理的数理分析
引用本文:黄丞,张录法."医药合谋"内在机理的数理分析[J].武汉理工大学学报,2005,27(5):83-85.
作者姓名:黄丞  张录法
作者单位:上海交通大学管理学院,上海,200052
基金项目:国家自然科学基金 (70 0 0 30 0 5 ,70 2 4 10 2 7) .
摘    要:对我国“医药合谋”的内在机理进行了数理分析,结果表明:医疗机构可以从药品更高的回扣率中荻利,但是回扣率的提高会减少药商的利润,两者在回扣率上不存在共同利益。因此医疗机构不去要求药商提供更大的回扣率,而是与药商达成多开药、开高价药的“双赢”合谋模式。并在此基础上提出了进一步深化改革的建议。

关 键 词:医药舍谋  内在机理  医疗机构
文章编号:1671-4431(2005)05-0083-03
修稿时间:2004年12月8日

Mathematical Analyses on the Inherent Mechanism of Collusion between Hospitals and Pharmaceutical Institutions
HUANG Cheng,ZHANG Lu-fa.Mathematical Analyses on the Inherent Mechanism of Collusion between Hospitals and Pharmaceutical Institutions[J].Journal of Wuhan University of Technology,2005,27(5):83-85.
Authors:HUANG Cheng  ZHANG Lu-fa
Abstract:The paper analysed the inherent mechanism of collusion between hospitals and pha rmaceutical institutions.The result shows that hospitals could make more profit but pharmaceutical institutions make less profit from more discount rate of phar macy so that they reach the win-win collusion through increasing prices and qua ntity of pharmacy. Based on the analyses, the paper put forward the further sugg estions for deepening the related reform.
Keywords:collusion between hospitals and pharmaceutical i nstitutions  inherent mechanism  medical institutions
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