Evolutionary game-based incentive models for sustainable trust enhancement in a blockchained shared manufacturing network |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Key Laboratory of Road Construction Technology and Equipment of MOE, Chang’an University, Xi’an, Shaanxi 710064, China;2. Institute of Smart Manufacturing Systems Engineering, Chang’an University, Xi’an, Shaanxi 710064, China;3. State Key Laboratory of Precision Electronic Manufacturing Technology and Equipment, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510006, China;4. Hubei University of Automotive Technology, Shiyan, Hubei 442002, China;5. Chengdu Research Institute, City University of Hong Kong, Chengdu 610200, China;6. Shenzhen Research Institute, City University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen 518057, China;1. School of Management, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, PR China;2. Mechanical Engineering and Design Department, Université de Bourgogne Franche-Comté, Université de technologie de Belfort-Montbéliard, Belfort Cedex, France;3. School of Mechanical Engineering, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, PR China;4. Guangdong Provincial Key Laboratory of Advanced Welding Technology for Ships, CSSC Huangpu Wenchong Shipbuilding Company Limited, Guangzhou, PR China;1. Department of Industrial Engineering, School of Mines, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, Jiangsu, China;2. Department of Industrial Engineering, Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China;1. Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China;2. College of Mechanical Engineering, Donghua University, Shanghai 201620, China;3. Shanghai Waigaoqiao Shipbuilding Company, Shanghai 200137, China |
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| Abstract: | Shared manufacturing (SM) is an advanced manufacturing mode to solve the problems of information asymmetry and resource imbalance in the complex supply and demand relationship under the background of mass personalization. Blockchain can provide technical solutions for trust issues between manufacturing service providers and demanders, but less research has focused on the stable maintenance of a blockchained shared manufacturing network (BSMN). Industrial knowledge graph and cognitive intelligence play an important role in designing incentive mechanisms for BSMN. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper designs various incentive models and develops the corresponding smart contracts to encourage different enterprises to participate in the “accounting” operations, to enhance the trust and maintain the operational stability of BSMN. Firstly, the evolution mechanism of BSMN was analyzed. Then, an evolutionary game model between shared manufacturing enterprise nodes was established to deduce the stable state of BSMN. Based on the analysis of the evolutionarily stable state, an incentive model with three strategies to encourage different enterprise nodes to participate in “accounting” operations was determined, and smart contracts of the incentive models were developed. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed incentive models was verified by simulation experiments. |
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| Keywords: | Shared manufacturing Evolutionary game theory Smart contracts Blockchain Incentive model |
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