| 晋升博弈中行政官员激励问题分析与解决对策 |
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| 引用本文： | 胡平波,万公平,楼天容.晋升博弈中行政官员激励问题分析与解决对策[J].南昌水专学报,2005,24(4):63-66. |
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| 作者姓名： | 胡平波 万公平 楼天容 |
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| 作者单位： | [1]南昌工程学院理学系,江西南昌330099 [2]江西财经大学工商管理学院,江西南昌330013 [3]江西星子一中,江西星子332800 |
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| 摘 要： | 建立了一个晋升博弈模型，分析了行政官员晋升激励问题的内在原因，并讨论了解决问题的对策．消除行贿受贿等权力寻租的体制因素是激励行政官员积极工作的有效途径．
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| 关 键 词： | 晋升博弈 权力寻租 激励 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-4869(2005)04-0063-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年8月27日 |
Analysis of Incentive Question and its Solution on Administrative Officials in the Political Tournaments |
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| HU Ping-bo.Analysis of Incentive Question and its Solution on Administrative Officials in the Political Tournaments[J].Journal of Nanchang College of Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric Power,2005,24(4):63-66. |
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| Authors: | HU Ping-bo |
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| Affiliation: | HU Ping-bo~ |
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| Abstract: | This paper sets up a model of political tournaments,analyzes the incentive question of the promotion among the administrative officials,and puts forward a possible solution.Eliminating such power rent-seeking system as bribery in the political tournament is all effective way to stimulate the officials to work harol. |
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| Keywords: | political tournament power rent-seeking incentive |
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