| 企业管理中的委托代理问题研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 闫森,杜纲. 企业管理中的委托代理问题研究[J]. 工业工程, 2007, 10(3): 31-33 |
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| 作者姓名： | 闫森 杜纲 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072 |
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| 摘 要： | 现代企业的所有者和经理人之间是委托代理关系,如何防止信息不对称条件下经理人的机会主义行为是企业管理需要解决的重要问题.将经理人的努力分为生产性努力和分配性努力,运用委托代理理论建立了基于企业所有者和经理人的委托代理模型.依据模型的求解结果对企业管理中的各种因素对经理人行为的影响进行了分析.在模型分析的基础上,提出了企业所有者为防止经理人的机会主义行为应采取的措施.
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| 关 键 词： | 企业管理 委托代理 激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-7375（2007）03-0031-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-12-06 |
The Study on Principal-agent Problem in Enterprise Management |
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| YAN Sen,DU Gang. The Study on Principal-agent Problem in Enterprise Management[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2007, 10(3): 31-33 |
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| Authors: | YAN Sen DU Gang |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China |
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| Abstract: | Because of the principal-agent relationship between the owner and the manager in modern enterprise,how to prevent the manager from opportunism behaviors is a crucial aspect in enterprise management with asymmetric information.Manager's behaviors are divided into productive efforts and opportunistic efforts and principal-agent theory is employed to establish a principal-agent model of the owner and the manager.Based on the result,the effects of various factors in enterprise management upon manager's behaviors are explored.Some measures to prevent opportunism behaviors of the manager are put forward based on the analysis of the model. |
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| Keywords: | enterprise management principal-agent incentive mechanism |
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