基于职业生涯的企业家投资行为博弈研究

出于职业生涯考虑，企业家的投资行为可能偏重于提高经理市场的评价而远离股东利益最大化的目标．通过建立一个企业家才能推测的不完全信息动态博弈模型，研究了企业家职位的稳定性、企业家才能推测的可靠性对企业家投资短视行为的影响，认为市场对企业家才能了解越准确和企业家职位越稳定，企业家投资短视行为空间越小．企业应该充分利用内部劳动力市场在观察和掌握企业家的经营能力、努力程度信号方面的信息效率优势，从内部提拔企业家．

A game of entrepreneur's investment behavior based on the career concern

The behavior of entrepreneurs on investment may deviate from the shareholders' optimal interest based on their career concerns. By developing a dynamic game model of incomplete information about the ability speculation of the entrepreneur, the effects of tenure of entrepreneur and the accurate extent of the ability speculation on the investment myopia behavior are studied. The incentive for investment myopia behavior is inversely related to the precision of the ability speculation and tenure of entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs should be selected and promoted from the insider of the firm in order to mitigate the myopia investment behavior.